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CASE COMMENT
CUSTODIAL "SEIZURES" AND THE POISON
TREE DOCTRINE: DUNAWAY V. NEW
YORK* AND ITS AFTERMATH
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution1
guarantees to the people freedom from "unreasonable searches
and seizures" '2 and specifically outlines the requisites for issuance of arrest and search warrants. This provision was first afforded real meaning when the United States Supreme Court
adopted the federal exclusionary rule. 3 This rule, as originally
* 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. This protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures" was
undoubtedly included in the Bill of Rights in response to the repulsion
against "writs of assistance" in the colonies, and the use of "general warrants" in England. The "writs of assistance," which allowed British customs officials, at their discretion, to search private homes for smuggled
goods, were characterized by James Otis, in 1761, as the "worst instrument
of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and fundamental
principle of law, that ever was found in an English law book." Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Execution of "general warrants," which left blank the persons or place
to be searched, or things to be seized, was declared illegal by Lord Camden
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils (Eng. C.P.) 275 (1765)
(commonly known as the Wilkes case). See generally E.C. FISHER, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE

(1st ed. 1970).

The fourth amendment's requirement of specificity of search warrants
is directly traceable to the condemnation of general warrants. It is aimed to
prevent arbitrary intrusion by police into the private affairs of the people.
See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476 (1965). For an examination of the history of the fourth amendment and
the English experience with general warrants, see Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the defendant
was convicted of using the mails to transport lottery tickets. Admitted evidence included that seized by a United States Marshall when he searched
the defendant's home without a warrant. The Supreme Court announced
that if documents which were illegally seized could be used in evidence
against a citizen accused of a crime, "the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned might well be
stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393. Accordingly, the Court held that
the warrantless search violated the fourth amendment and that the trial
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applied, required the exclusion of evidence in a federal criminal
trial if obtained illegally by federal authorities. 4 Forty-eight
years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,5 the Supreme Court elevated the
rule to constitutional status in applying it to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 The
court erred in refusing to return this material to the defendant on his pretrial motion for return of all items unlawfully seized. Id.
The Supreme Court had first suggested, in dictum in 1886, that evidence
obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment should not be admissible

against a defendant. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, a
quasi-criminal proceeding was instituted against the defendants, seeking a
forfeiture of their property for alleged fraud contravening the revenue laws.
Pursuant to statute, the defendants were ordered to produce books, invoices, and papers, and their failure to do so constituted an admission of the
allegations. Justice Bradley, in his discussion of constitutional matters
stated: "[B]reaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man's own testimony, or of his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of a crime, or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of
that judgment. In this regard the fourth and fifth amendments run almost
into each other." Id. at 624. Yet before Weeks, in Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585 (1904), the Supreme Court had declined to follow the dictum expressed by Justice Bradley in Boyd and reiterated the rule that where evidence was competent, the collateral question on how it was obtained would
not be pursued.

4. This rule did not go without its critics. See, e.g., People v. De Fore,
243 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926), in which Justice (then Judge) Cardozo made
his often-quoted statement that "the criminal is to go free because the Constable has blundered." Id. at 21, 150 N.E. at 590. See Burger, Who Will
Watch the Watchman, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Plumb,
Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337 (1939).

5. 367 U.S. 643 (1963).
6. In Mapp, the defendant was convicted of having obscene materials
in her possession in violation of an Ohio statute. The police seized the
materials when they forcibly gained admittance to her home, purportedly
because they had information that a person wanted for questioning in connection with a bombing was hiding therein. The State contended that even
if the search had been made without authority, it was not prevented from
using the unconstitutionally seized evidence. The Supreme Court rejected
this contention, and in doing so, overruled that portion of Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), which had refused to extend the exclusionary rule to the
states. The Wolf Court recognized that the "security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion-which is at the core of the fourth amendmentis basic to a free society,.. . and is therefore implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and as such is enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause." The Court, however, declined to go further and hold the
exclusion of tainted evidence an integral part of the fourth amendment.
As it had in Weeks, the Mapp ruling provoked sharp debate. Burns,
Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 80 (1969); McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy, 15

ARIz. L. REV. 327 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McKay]; Traynor, Mapp v.
Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319; Note, The Privacy Interest of the Fourth Amendment-Does Mapp v. Ohio Protect it or Pillage it,
74 W. VA. L. REV. 154 (1971). It continues to elicit heated criticism today.

See, e.g., Gottlieb, FeedbackFrom the FourthAmendment: Is the Exclusion-

ary Rule an Albatross around the JudicialNeck?, 67 Ky. L.J. 1007 (1979).
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Court announced that "[a ll evidence obtained in violation of
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
'7
State court."
In support of this pronouncement, three divergent theories
have emerged.8 The early rationale had reflected an emphasis
on individual rights, 9 indicating that the Constitution itself
granted the accused the right to have the evidence excluded.
Secondly, the rule was said to preserve judicial integrity. 10 The
admission of tainted evidence would have the necessary effect
of legitimizing unconstitutional police conduct." Finally, in recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied on a deterrence theory which regards the exclusionary rule as a means
12
of effectively discouraging lawless police conduct.
7. 367 U.S. at 655. Before Mapp, the Court had expressed dissatisfaction with the Wolf decision and accordingly would reverse a state conviction when it found that the evidence which was used to convict the
defendant was the product of police practices that "shocked the conscience." A most vivid example resulted in a reversal of defendant's conviction in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (warrantless search during
which officers transported defendant to hospital and had his stomach
pumped).
Another landmark decision which preceded Mapp was Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), which partially emasculated the holding in Wolf.
The Court banned the so-called "silver platter doctrine" practice which had
allowed evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure by
state officials, without federal participation, to be introduced against a defendant in a federal criminal trial.
8. For a thorough analysis of the rationales for the exclusionary rule,
and their validity, see Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule:
Past,Present,No Future, 61 A.B.A.J. 507 (1975).
9. Id. at 508.
10. Justice Holmes emphasized this concept when he wrote, "I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argumentfor Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1973):
[T] he principle of judicial review has been recognized as a legitimate
means by which the Court performs its duty to uphold the Constitution.
Likewise, in the fourth amendment arena, the means by which the
Court performs its duty appears to be through satisfying its responsibilities under the judicial review/integrity rationale comprehensively to
protect a defendant's fourth amendment rights.
Id. at 1155-56.
12. In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court stated:
"[T]he rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217; accord,
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (Court refused to apply Mapp retroactively, announcing the purpose of the rule to be deterrence and the fact
that the deterrent purpose would not be enhanced by applying the rule ret-
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In order to understand the exclusionary rule, it is necessary
to examine the situations in which its application is warranted.
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule is triggered when an
13
intrusion amounts to an "unreasonable search or seizure."'
Therefore, one appropriate question is whether a given "search"
or "seizure" is "reasonable" within the meaning of the Constitution.14 If it is not, the principles underlying the exclusionary
rule must still be examined to determine whether the evidence
was obtained via the fourth amendment violation and must be
excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"' 5 there being no
break in the connection between the illegality and the derivation of evidence. Yet, often before courts can reach the "reasonableness" issue, they must determine whether the particular
intrusion even amounts to a "search" or "seizure" in the fourth
amendment sense.
Obviously, not all confrontations between police and citizens involve "seizures of persons."'16 If an individual voluntarily
accompanies police officers to the station house, there is no
"seizure," and the judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of
the exchange ends. 17 A "seizure" occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away."' 8 However, the officer must by means of physical force
or show of authority restrain the liberty of the individual before
it can be concluded that a "seizure" has occurred. 19
rospectively); cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness
summoned to appear before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure).
13. "The exclusionary rule traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). It is now clear
that the rule extends to any and all evidence indirectly obtained as a result
of the unlawful activity. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920). 'The essense of forbidding the aquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely that evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
14. This comment will focus on (1) whether the intrusion upon an individual amounts to a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment;
(2) whether the seizure was reasonable; and (3) whether evidence connected with an unlawful "seizure" is still admissible in court.
15. See generally Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments as Viewed Through its Exceptions, 31 U. MiAmiI L. REv. 615 (1977).
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
17. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). "Voluntary question-

ing not involving any 'seizure' for Fourth Amendment purposes may take
place under any number of varying circumstances. And the occasions will
not be few when a particular individual agrees voluntarily to answer questions ... and later regrets his willingness to answer those questions." Id.
at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16.
19. Id. at 19 n.16.
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The most obvious example of a fourth amendment seizure
by police is the official arrest. Indeed, traditionally "[t] he term
'arrest' was synonomous with those seizures governed by the
Fourth Amendment. ' 20 A long line of precedents has established that an arrest is reasonable only if supported by "probable cause. ' 21 This requirement applied to arrests perfected with

or without a warrant 22 and appeared absolute until Terry v.
23

Ohio.

Terry involved an on-the-street confrontation between a citizen and a policeman investigating suspicious circumstances and
introduced the doctrine now commonly referred to as "stop and
frisk." The Supreme Court recognized an exception to the general rule that probable cause was required before a seizure
could be reasonable under the fourth amendment. The brief onthe-spot "stop and frisk" for weapons "did not fit comfortably
within the traditional concept of an arrest" because it was substantially less intrusive. The intrusion was substantial enough
to amount to a "seizure," 24 but the requirement of probable
25
cause applicable to arrests was replaced with a balancing test
to determine reasonableness. After balancing the limited viola20. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
21. E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Probable cause
exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925)).
22. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959).
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. The Court stated:
There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as "stop and frisk"
that such police conduct is outside the purview of the fourth amendment because neither action rises to a level of a "search" and "seizure"
within the meaning of the constitution. We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of
the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and
prosecution for crime-"arrest" in traditional terminology.
Id. at 16. However, the Terry Court determined that the point at which
Terry was seized was when he was subjected to the "frisk," stating that
"there can be no question that [the officer] 'seized' petitioner and subjected
him to a 'search' when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surface of his clothing." Id. at 19. In a footnote, however, the Court indicated

that the record was uncertain as to whether "any such 'seizure' took place
prior to [ the ] officer ['s I initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons." Id. n. 16. Therefore, the Court concluded, "we...
may assume that up to that point no intrusions upon constitutionally protected rights had occurred." Id.
25. In balancing the opposing interests involved, the Court stated:
Our evaluation of the proper balance to be struck in this type of case
leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
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tion of individual privacy involved against the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and the police officer's
safety, the Court concluded that the "seizure" was justified
but only for the purpose of a pat down
without probable cause,
26
search for weapons.
After Terry, the constitutional propriety of "custodial detention" not amounting to an arrest remained unresolved. The
Terry Court expressly refrained from deciding whether an investigative "seizure" upon less than probable cause, for pur27
poses of "detention" and/or "interrogation," was permissible.
The following year, in Morales v. New York, 28 the Supreme

Court again chose "not to grapple with the question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full
fledged arrest,

'29

this time because of the absence of a record

and fully illuminated the facthat squarely presented the issue
30
tual context in which it arose.
In its 1975 Brown v. Illinois31 decision, the Court indicated
its disdain for custodial questioning on less than probable cause,
but in that case the defendant had been officially arrested. The
Court condemned the police conduct, which was purportedly for
investigative purposes, because the officers acted without probable cause. But the thrust of the case dealt with the relationship
between the fourth and fifth amendments. Specifically, the issue was whether the interposing of Miranda32 warnings suffiofficer, where he is dealing with an armed individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest for a crime.
Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 30. "The Terry case created an exception to the requirement
of probable cause, an exception whose 'narrow scope' [the) Court has been
careful to maintain." Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343 (1979) (refused to
extend "reasonable belief' balancing test to evidence gathering function).
27. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.

28. 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
29. Id. at 104-05.
30. Id. The Court of Appeals of New York had held that police could
detain an individual, upon "reasonable suspicion," for questioning for a
brief period of time, under carefully controlled conditions. People v.

Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968). The Supreme

Court remanded because the original hearing was devoted to the voluntariness of the confession and not to the nature of the detention. On remand,
the New York court determined that Morales had gone to the police voluntarily. People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 137-38, 366 N.E.2d 248, 252-53, 397
N.Y.S.2d 587, 592 (1977.). This, however, was its alternative holding. It initially reiterated the views expressed in its earlier opinion that the detention
was permissible even absent probable cause.
31. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). In Brown, the defendant was arrested at gunpoint without probable cause by police who had forcibly entered his home.
After being advised of his Miranda rights, he made two incriminating statements in custody. The defendant successfully challenged these statements
as inadmissible because they were the product of the unlawful arrest.
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In this landmark decision,
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ciently purged the taint of the unlawful arrest, such that the
statements made by the defendant, while in custody, would be
admissible against him. The Supreme Court ruled that they
were not admissible and identified three factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest: (1) the temporal proximity of the
arrest; (2) the presence of intervening factors; and, particularly,
33
(3) the purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct.
Finally, in 1979, Dunaway v. New York 34 provided a forum
for the Court to explore the reserved question. Dunaway
squarely presented the issue of the legality of an involuntary
custodial interrogation on less than probable cause, where the
detention did not amount to an "official arrest." The Court was
also provided with an opportunity to further explain the factors
enunciated in Brown.
THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 26, 1971, in Rochester, New York, the proprietor of
a small pizza parlor was shot and killed during an attempted
robbery. Four months later, Irving Dunaway, a small, black
teenager, was "picked up" by the police and taken into custody.
The police conceded that they did not have sufficient informathe Supreme Court held that when an individual is taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way, law enforcement
authorities must advise him of certain constitutional rights. Specifically,
he must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if

he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning.
Id. at 448. Unless the State establishes that such warnings were given, or
were knowingly and intelligently waived, no evidence obtained as a result
of the interrogation can be used against the person. Id. See also Rhode
Island v. Innis, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980), the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the Miranda procedural safeguards that are triggered whenever an
individual is subjected to "custodial interrogation." Justice Stewart, writing
for the Court, further explained "custodial interrogation" in the context of
Miranda, stating:
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only
to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.
Id. at 1689 (footnotes omitted).
33. 422 U.S. at 603-04 (burden of showing admissibility rests on prosecution).
34. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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tion to obtain a warrant for his arrest. 35 Dunaway was not technically placed under arrest, although he would have been
physically restrained had he attempted to leave.36 After being
moved to an interrogation room at police headquarters and
given the Miranda warnings, 37 Dunaway waived counsel and
eventually made incriminating statements and sketches. 38 Subsequently, he was indicted for armed robbery and felony murder. Following denial of his pretrial motion to suppress, 39 the
inculpatory statements and sketches were admitted into evidence, and Dunaway was convicted. That judgment was affirmed by the appellate division, and by the New York Court of
40
Appeals without opinion.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded 4' the case for further consideration in light of the Court's supervening decision of Brown v.
Illinois.42 The New York Court of Appeals then remanded to
43
the trial court for a hearing to make further findings of fact.
After this supplementary hearing, the trial court granted the
35. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d 299, 302, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1978). A
police lieutenant directed his plain clothes detectives to find Dunaway and
bring him to the station for questioning. Their suspicion stemmed from
stale rumors and triple hearsay. The facts were confusing. Several months
after the murder, one policeman learned from a fellow officer that an informant had said that a man named Cole said he and Irving were involved.
The informant did not know Irving's last name but identified a picture of
Dunaway from a police file. Cole, a jail inmate awaiting trial for burglary,
was questioned and denied any involvement. However, he implicated Dunaway, claiming that two months previously he [Cole I had learned from Hubert Adams that Hubert's brother "BaBa" Adams and Irving [Dunaway]
had committed the murder. Hubert allegedly learned this information from
his brother "BaBa."
36. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978) (per stipulation of People at conclusion of hearing).
37. See note 32 supra.
38. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d 299, 300, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (1978).
The first statement was made within an hour after Dunaway reached the
station. The sketches were drawn at the request of the police, and a second
more complete statement was made the following day.
39. People v. Dunaway, 38 N.Y.2d 810, 345 N.E.2d 583, 382 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1975) (memorandum opinion). Dunaway made the motion to suppress on
the ground that the evidence was obtained during a period of illegal detention subsequent to an illegal seizure, without a showing of probable cause.
The trial court, at this first hearing, denied the motion, ruling only on the
voluntariness aspect of the statements and sketches, and not on the nature
of the detention.
40. People v. Dunaway, 42 A.D.2d 689, 346 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1973), affd, 35
N.Y.2d 741, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974).
41. 422 U.S. 1053 (1975).
42. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
43. People v. Dunaway, 38 N.Y.2d 810, 345 N.E.2d 583, 382, N.Y.S.2d 40
(1975). In compliance with the remand from the United States Supreme
Court, the court remitted for a factual hearing to decide the issue concerning the nature of the detention; whether there was probable cause; or in the
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motion to suppress, rejecting the precedential value of People v.
Morales," in which the Court of Appeals of New York had upheld a similar detention on less than probable cause. 45 Rather,
the trial court believed that the controlling authority was Brown
v. Illinois,4 6 which indicated a "disdain for custodial questioning
without probable cause to arrest. '47 The trial court further held
that the recital of Miranda warnings alone did not purge the
taint of the illegal seizure. Therefore, the evidence was held
inadmissible.
The appellate division reversed. 48 Relying directly on the
court of appeals' Morales decision, the court upheld the detention on "reasonable suspicion" because it was brief, the defendant was fully advised of his constitutional rights, there was no
formal accusation filed against him, and great public interest existed in solving a brutal crime. 49 Alternatively, the court determined that the police conduct was not flagrant, and therefore,
even if the detention was illegal, the confessions were the prod50
uct of defendant's free will and thus admissible.
The court of appeals dismissed Dunaway's application for
leave to appeal, and his motion for reargument on the judgment
was denied. 51 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to "clarify the Fourth Amendment's requirements as to the
permissible grounds for custodial interrogation and to review
''52
the New York court's application of Brown v. Illinois.
OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court reversed the state appellate court decision, 53 holding that the police violated the fourth and fourteenth
event that there was a detention without probable cause, whether the

"making of the confession was rendered infirm by the illegal arrest." Id.
44. See note 30 supra.

45. Id.
46. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
47. It should be noted that the hearing court found that there was an
"arrest," but that the factual predicate in this case did not amount to proba-

ble cause to support the arrest. That decision, rendered by the Honorable
Donald J. Mark, Monroe County Court Judge, is not reported. See Brief for
Petitioner at 14, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
48. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978).
49. Id. at 304, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
50. Id.
51. See Brief for Petitioner, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
52. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206 (1979).

53. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Dunaway argued that the appellate division erroneously reversed the trial court's suppression of the inclupatory statements and sketches. To support this argument, the
defendant submitted that he was "arrested" without probable cause, in violation of the fourth amendment, and the subsequent statements and draw-
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amendments when, without probable cause, they "seized" Dunaway and transported him to the police station for questioning.
The Court rejected the State's contention that this type of
"seizure" could be justified on "reasonable suspicion." The intrusion was found to be indistinguishable from a traditional arrest 54 and substantially different from the narrow intrusions in
Terry and its progeny 55 which were judged by a balancing test
rather than the probable cause standard. Regardless of its label,
the custodial interrogation was such a serious intrusion on Dunaway's privacy that it necessarily triggered application of the
traditional safeguards against an illegal arrest.
The Court further found that the "causal connection" between Dunaway's unlawful detention and his subsequent statements and sketches was not sufficiently attenuated to permit
the use of this evidence at trial. The Dunaway Court reiterated
the three factors enunciated in Brown and concluded that the
overall situations in both cases were virtually identical.
ANALYSIS

"The Seizure": A PreliminaryFinding
At the outset of the majority opinion, Justice Brennan announced that the Court would decide the issue left open in
Morales, namely, the constitutionality of "custodial questioning
on less than probable cause for a full fledged arrest. '5 6 While
this issue was ultimately resolved by the Court, this phraseology assumed that the custodial questioning was "involuntary"
and hence amounted to a "seizure." The Court disposed of this
ings were a product of this illegal arrest and therefore inadmissible.
Furthermore, despite full compliance by the police with the fifth amendment safeguards, the "causal connection" between the initial illegality and

the resultant evidence was not sufficiently broken, under the standards articulated in Brown, to render the evidence admissible.
Alternatively, the defendant argued that if his confrontation with the
police was not a "technical arrest," it was nonetheless a "seizure" under the
fourth amendment, made for the purpose of detention and/or interrogation,
without probable cause, and as such, violated his fourth amendment rights.
See Brief for Petitioner at 25, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
54. 442 U.S. at 206.
55. After Terry, the Supreme Court twice departed from the rule that
probable cause was required to justify all police seizures, but both deci-

sions involved limited weapons frisks, not arising in a custodial interrogation context. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (order to get out of
car after car is lawfully detained for a traffic violation; frisk for weapons
justified after bulge observed in jacket); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (frisk for weapons upheld on reasonable suspicion). See also United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)

suspicious automobiles near U.S. borders).
56. 442 U.S. at 202.

(brief interrogation stops of

1980]

Dunaway v. New York

threshold issue by stating in one sentence that "there can be
little doubt that petitioner was 'seized' in the Fourth Amendment sense when he was taken involuntarily to the police station. '57 Apparently influenced by the police officers' concession
that Dunaway would have been physically restrained had he attempted to leave, the Court accepted the trial court's finding
58
that the detention was involuntary.
Justice Rehnquist dissented and strongly disagreed with
the majority's resolution of this issue, believing that the county
court did not apply Terry in determining whether Dunaway accompanied the police voluntarily. He stated: "[T]he question
turns on whether the officer's conduct is objectively coercive or
physically threatening not on the mere fact that a person might
in some measure feel cowed by the fact that a request is made
'5 9
by the police officer."
Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
encounter, it would appear that Dunaway's detention was involuntary,60 and that Justice Rehnquist's approach is unrealistically narrow. Moreover, such a factual determination is
properly left with the trial court since it is best equipped to
57. Id. It should be noted that the State argued that the defendant accompanied the police voluntarily, and therefore was not "seized" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.
In a footnote, the Court cited the A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure § 201 930 and commentary at 91 (tentative draft No. 1, 1966), to
the effect that a "request to come to the police station may easily carry an
implication of obligation while the appearance itself, unless clearly stated
to be voluntary, may be an awesome experience for the ordinary citizen."
442 U.S. at 207 n.6. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), in
which the Chief Justice recommended that the Court adopt the A.L.I.'s proposal in dealing with the exclusion of evidence. Evidence would be suppressed only if the Court found that the violation was substantial. See also
McKay, supra note 6, for a discussion of Art. 290 of the proposed Model
Code dealing with evidentiary exclusion.
58. 442 U.S. at 202. But cf. State v. Morgan, 299 N.C. 191, 261 S.E.2d 827
(1980) (no fourth amendment "seizure" where, although defendant did not
initiate encounter with police, he accompanied officers to station and remained despite being advised he was free to leave).
59. 442 U.S. at 224 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, with
whom the Chief Justice dissented, stated that he would have had little difficulty in joining the Court's opinion on the issue of whether custodial questioning without probable cause was permissible. However, in his view of
the case, Dunaway voluntarily went with the police to answer their questions and, therefore, was not "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
60. Dunaway was 18 years old, 5'7" tall, and weighed 130 pounds. He
was confronted by two plain clothes detectives, both 6'3" or taller, and each
weighing in excess of 200 pounds. Furthermore, the officers, in response to
hypotheticals at trial, indicated that Dunaway would have been physically
restrained had he attempted to leave. See People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d
299, 304, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (1978) (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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make it. Nevertheless, it does appear that the majority begged
the question by holding that there was a "seizure" because
there was an "involuntary detention." Since a threshold requirement for fourth amendment claims is that a "seizure" has
occurred, perhaps a more detailed analysis by the Court on this
issue could have alleviated ambiguities concerning the standard
to be applied. 6 1 After deciding that Dunaway was "seized" in
61. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.Ct. 1870
(May 27, 1980), had yet another opportunity to address the "seizure" issue.
The Court, however, did little to clarify existing confusion concerning when
an individual is "seized." Indeed, the decision appears inconsistent with
Dunaway. In Mendenhall, the defendant was convicted of possession of
heroin with intent to distribute following denial by the district court of her
pretrial motion to suppress the introduction of the heroin. The defendant
contended that the evidence against her had been acquired through an unconstitutional search and seizure by Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents. The initial encounter between defendant and DEA agents
began on the concourse at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport shortly after
defendant disembarked from an airline flight which originated in Los Angeles. The defendant was the last passenger to alight from the plane, claimed
no luggage, and proceeded to another airline counter, located in a different
terminal, to receive her boarding pass for a flight from Detroit to Pittsburgh.
The DEA agents had no advance information about the defendant. After
observing her "unusual" behavior which they described as fitting the socalled "drug courier profile-an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs," id. at 1873 n.1, the
agents approached the defendant, identified themselves, and asked to see
her identification and airline ticket. After producing an airline ticket and
driver's license, bearing different names, and responding to brief questions,
defendant was asked to accompany the agents to the airport DEA office for
further questioning. The defendant accompanied the agents to the office,
although the record did not indicate whether she gave a verbal response to
the agents' request. At the office, defendant reportedly consented to a body
search of her person by a female officer which revealed two plastic bags of
heroin.
The district court, in denying defendant's pretrial motion to suppress,
concluded that the agents' conduct in initially approaching defendant was
"a permissive investigative stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)," in that it was based on "specific and articulable facts that
justified a suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. Mendenhall, 100
S.Ct. at 1874. The district court further found that defendant accompanied
the agents to the office "voluntarily" and the consent to the search was
freely and voluntarily given. The court of appeals reversed in an unreported opinion, and on rehearing en banc, reaffirmed its original decision,
stating that defendant had not voluntarily consented to the search. United
States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1980).
The United States Supreme Court, in a widely divided decision, reversed. The Court concluded that the initial encounter between defendant
and DEA agents on the concourse at the airport did not constitute a
"seizure," and that the "District Court's determination that the [defendant]
consented to the search of her person 'freely and voluntarily' was sustained
by the evidence." United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1880 (1980).
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, viewed the initial encounter as "an
encounter that intruded upon no constitutionally protected rights." He
stated that "a person is 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at
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the fourth amendment sense, the Court focused on whether this
"seizure," which did not amount to an arrest, was constitutionally permissible.
The Illegality of Involuntary Custodial Interrogations
on Less Than Probable Cause
The State claimed that at the time of his "seizure," the po1877. Considering the facts before him, Justice Stewart concluded that the
defendant "had no objective reason to believe that she was not free to end
the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way .. " Id. at 1878.
Therefore, the initial encounter did not constitute a "seizure." Only Justice
Rehnquist, however, concurred on this finding. A separate majority, while
assuming that defendant was "seized," believed that the "stop" was permissible because there were reasonable grounds to justify it.
Justice Stewart, speaking for a majority of the Court, further held that
the defendant's fourth amendment rights were not violated when she went
from the concourse to the DEA office. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, he found that the district court's determination that she accompanied the agents to the office "voluntarily in a spirit of apparent
cooperation," was sustained by the record. Similarly, he concluded that her
consent to the search of her person was given freely and voluntarily.
The four dissenting Justices (White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens),
all of whom were in the Dunaway majority, believed that the Court's decision could not be reconciled with Dunaway. The dissenters first criticised
the majority's examination of whether the defendant was "seized." Justice
White stated that the proper course would have been to remand for an evidentiary hearing on the question, since "throughout the lower court proceedings ... , the Government never questioned that the initial stop of Ms.
Id. at 1884. Rather, the government consistMendenhall was a 'seizure.'
ently maintained that the "stop" was justified because the agents were acting on reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal
activity. The dissenters therefore assumed, as did the concurring justices,
that defendant was "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment
when she was stopped by the agents. Unlike the concurring justices however, the dissenters concluded that the agents were not justified in "seizing"
Ms. Mendenhall because their suspicion could only have been based on "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' rather than specific reasonable inferences." Id. at 1887. Furthermore, the dissenters argued that
the finding that Ms. Mendenhall consented to go to the DEA office was unsupported by the record and inconsistent with Dunaway. "The evidence of
consent here is even flimisier than that we rejected in Dunaway where it
was claimed that the suspect made an affirmative response when asked if
he would accompany the officers to the police station." Id. at 1888. In conclusion, Justice White stated that it was "unbelievable" that the sequence
of events from the initial encounter to the strip search involved no invasion
of a citizen's constitutionally protected interest in privacy. "'Will you walk
into my parlour?'said the spiderto afly; (you may find you have consented,
without ever knowing why.)" Id. at 1889 n.15 (emphasis added).
But see Reid v. Georgia, 48 U.S.L.W. 3847 (1980) (per curiam). In a case
remarkably similar to Mendenhall,the Court determined that the petitioner
was unlawfully "seized" when approached by DEA agents outside an airline terminal. The Court, in rejecting the lower court's conclusion that the
"seizure" was permissible because the petitioner fit the so-called "drug courier profile," concluded that "the agent could not, as a matter of law, have
reasonably suspected the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of
these observed circumstances." Id. at 3848.
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lice had "reasonable suspicion" that Dunaway possessed "intimate knowledge about a serious and unsolved crime. '62 It urged
the Supreme Court to adopt a Terry-like balancing test to uphold the seizure on "reasonable suspicion." Actually, the test
proposed by the State and adopted by the New York courts in
both People v. Morales63 and Dunaway was a multifactor balancing test of reasonable police conduct 64 to cover all seizures
not amounting to technical arrests. 65 The factors that the New
York courts believed supported such an intrusion without probable cause were: (1) there was a "reasonable suspicion" that
the suspect possessed knowledge of the crime; (2) the crime
was brutal and heinous; (3) the crime had remained unsolved
for a period of several months; (4) a great public interest existed
in solving this brutal crime; (5) all investigative techniques except interrogation had been exhausted; and (6) the brief detention resulted in no formal arrest record. 66 The New York courts
attempted to justify certain custodial seizures absent probable
cause by creating a tightly drawn rule, which would be limited
to exceptional circumstances, ample to protect fifth and sixth
amendment rights.
In rejecting this proposed relaxed standard, the Dunaway
Court examined Terry and its progeny and compared its own
facts to the limited police intrusions in those cases. Terry allowed a limited frisk for weapons when an officer believed that
criminal activity was afoot and that his safety was endangered.
In contrast to this brief on-the-street encounter, Dunaway was
picked up by police, transported to the police station, and, upon
arrival, placed in an interrogation room. The severity of the intrusion was not even roughly analogous to the frisk in Terry.
Rather, the detention of Dunaway was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional67arrest, and therefore the probable cause requirement applied.
In further support of its holding, the Dunaway Court relied
62. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 207. The State conceded that the
police lacked probable cause to arrest Dunaway but it argued that even if
there had been a seizure, it was permissible under the fourth amendment.
63. See note 30 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
65. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 213.
66. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d 299, 302, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1978);
People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 366 N.E.2d 248, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1977)

(court reiterated the views expressed in its earlier opinion 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238
N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968)).
67. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 212. "The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. Hostility to seizures based
on mere suspicion, or even strong reason to suspect was not adequate to
support a warrant for arrest." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
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69
on its decisions in Brown v. Illinois68 and Davis v. Mississippi.
In Brown, the Court had indicated its disdain for custodial questioning on less than probable cause and condemned the police
conduct, which in that case amounted to a technical arrest. "Although Brown's arrest had more of the trappings of a technical
formal arrest than [Dunaway's], such differences in form must
The application of the
not be exalted over substance ....
Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause does not
depend on whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed an
'arrest' under state law."'70

In Davis, in connection with a rape investigation, police had
brought in numerous black youths to the police station for questioning and fingerprinting. Ultimately, the defendant Davis'
fingerprints matched those found in the victim's home. The evidence was admitted against him, and he was convicted. The
Court rejected the State's argument that the detention without
probable cause was lawful because it occurred during an investigatory rather than accusatory stage for the sole purpose of
obtaining fingerprints. 71 The Court stated: "Nothing is more
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry,
whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory
detentions.' "72 In dictum, it was suggested that there may be
narrowly defined circumstances which would allow fingerprinting absent probable cause, but the Court declined to create such
an exception because it found that Davis was not merely fingerprinted during his detention, but was also subject to interroga73
tion .
A close examination of Davis suggests that Dunaway is not
only a reaffirmation of the Court's "disdain for custodial interrogations" without probable cause, but also an extension. In Davis, the police conduct was not even based on "reasonable
suspicion." The officers "rounded up" numerous young blacks
for fingerprinting because the victim had identified her attacker
68. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
69. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
70. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 212.
71. 394 U.S. at 726. In reversing, the Court rejected the State's argument
that fingerprint evidence, because of its trustworthiness, is not subject to
the fourth and fourteenth amendment proscriptions. The Court reiterated
its position that all evidence which is the result of an illegal search or
seizure is inadmissible in court. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1963). See
notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra. See generally Comment, Admissibility of FingerprintsSeized as a Result of an Illegal Detention, 47 J. URB.
LAw 733 (1970).
72. 394 U.S. at 726-27.
73. Id. at 729 (emphasis supplied).
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as a black youth. The defendant merely fit that very general
description, but certainly this information did not amount to a
"reasonable suspicion" that he was responsible. In Dunaway,
the police believed, and the lower courts found, that the officers
had "reasonable suspicion" that Dunaway was involved in the
murder.7 4 The Supreme Court thus expanded its prior holding
by rejecting any standard short of probable cause for an involuntary custodial interrogation, no matter how exceptional the
circumstances.
The Propriety of the New York Standard
The significance of the Dunaway holding becomes apparent
by envisioning the various problems which would result from
application of the rule proposed by the New York courts. In determining whether police action was justified in particular situations, the courts would have to consider all of the factors
enunciated by the New York courts in Morales and Dunaway
and define such terms as "reasonable suspicion," "brief detention," "carefully controlled circumstances," and "crimes which
are brutal and heinous. '75 Furthermore, the proposed balancing
test itself is not readily definable. The appellate division in Dunaway seemed to apply three different tests in upholding the police seizure on less than probable cause.
First, the appellate division, quoting from the court of appeals' Morales opinion, emphasized the fact that the detention
was brief and carefully controlled to protect Dunaway's fifth and
sixth amendment rights.7 6 Second, the court proposed that the
conduct of law enforcement officials should be judged by considering the "manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity
of the crime involved and the circumstances attending the encounter. '77 Finally, the court upheld the seizure and subsequent interrogation because it was a brief detention, based on
reasonable suspicion, to investigate a brutal and unsolved
crime, where no formal accusation was filed against the defend78
ant.
Perhaps the Supreme Court was disinclined to accept such
a rule when the confusion surrounding its application was al74. Since the Supreme Court did not accept the lower court's standard,
it did not address the issue of whether triple hearsay, several months old,
would constitute "reasonable suspicion."
75. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union and New York Civil
Liberties Union, Amici Curiae, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
76. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d at 301, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 492.

77. Id. (quoting People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 219; 352 N.E.2d 562, 569,
386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 382 (1976).
78. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d at 302, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
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ready apparent. More importantly, any attempt to fashion an
exception to the probable cause requirement in a situation so
closely resembling an arrest would threaten to destroy important fourth amendment safeguards. It would have amounted to
a clear departure from the probable cause requirement which
has been interpreted and applied by the courts for over two hundred years. 79 Indeed, "adopting the New York doctrine would
[have] require[d] re-writing fourth amendment law in a way
which would significantly impair the administration of justice as
well as individual liberty." 80
The Admissibility of Statements Made Following an Illegal
Arrest or Detention: The "AttenuationDoctrine"
Having found that Dunaway's detention was illegal, a further issue remained: whether the statements and sketches were
nevertheless admissible because they were not tainted by the
unlawful seizure. Not all evidence is subject to the exclusionary
rule "simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police."''a Evidence linked to a fourth
amendment violation is admissible if the causal connection between the initial illegality and the derived evidence is suffi83
82
ciently "attenuated" to dissipate the primary taint.
In Wong Sun v. United States,8 4 the Supreme Court announced the standard to be applied in determining whether a
statement or other evidence obtained subsequent to an illegal
arrest should be suppressed: "[W]hether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by means sufficiently
79. In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), the Court stated:
"[T] he standard of probable cause [represents] the accumulated wisdom of
precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to
make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest 'reasonable' under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 100.
80. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union and New York Civil Liberties Union, Amici Curiae at 10, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).

81. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480 (1963). This was the
first case in which the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to oral

evidence in the form of confessions. The Court concluded that "no logical

distinction existed between physical and verbal evidence in light of the pol-

icies underlying the rule." Id.
82. "Attenuate" is defined as: to make thin or slender, to lessen the
amount, force or value of: WEAKEN; to reduce the severity, virulence or
vitality of. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 72-73 (5th ed. 1977).
83. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), wherein the Court,

in dictum, noted that "sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between the information obtained through illicit [activity] and the

Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection
may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. at 341.
84. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. '8 5 Wong Sun
involved two defendants, and application of the above quoted
test resulted in different dispositions. Defendant Toy made incriminating statements to federal authorities shortly after police
forcibly entered his home and arrested him without a warrant or
probable cause. 86 Toy's statements were held inadmissible because they derived so immediately from the unlawful entry and
arrest. Under the circumstances, it was "unreasonable to infer
that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free will. '87 Defendant Wong Sun's confession, however, was admissible because "he was assumed to have acted on his own volition. '88 His
confession did not arise by exploitation of the illegal arrest.
Rather, he was lawfully arraigned, released on his own recognizance, and voluntarily returned to the police station several
days later to confess. Wong Sun, however, left unstated the factors to be considered in "poison tree" contexts.
The Supreme Court explained the "attenuation doctrine" in
further detail in the 1975 case of Brown v. Illinois.89 After condemning the police misconduct in arresting Brown without
probable cause, the Court focused on the admissibility of the defendant's confession which was made after he had been properly advised of his Miranda rights. 90 Reversing the Illinois
Supreme Court's affirmance of Brown's conviction, the Court
held that Miranda warnings do not, "per se," render admissible
a confession following an illegal arrest. 91 To be admissible, not
only must a confession be voluntary under the fifth amendment,
but the taint of any fourth amendment violation must be sufficiently removed. 92 Compliance with the fifth amendment will
not remedy a fourth amendment violation because the fourth
85. Id. at 488 (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
86. The police entry was effecuated, at night, in Toy's bedroom where
his wife and child lay sleeping.

87. 371 U.S. at 486.
88. See Note, Admissibility of Confessions Made Subsequent to an Ille-

gal Arrest: Wong Sun v. United States Revisited, 61 J. Cnrm.
OGY

L., CRIMINOL-

& P. Sci. 207, 209 (1970).

89. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
90. See note 32 supra.
91. 422 U.S. at 603.
If Mirandawarnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of
an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful
the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule
would be substantially dilluted .... Arrests made without a warrant or
without probable cause, for questioning or "investigation" would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well
be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda

warnings.
Id. at 602.
92. See Comment, Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule-Miranda
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amendment serves interests and policies distinct from those
safeguarded by the fifth.93 Nor would fourth amendment viola95
tions be sufficiently deterred. 94 Thus, although important, Mirandawarnings alone cannot assure that the fourth amendment
has not been unduly exploited.
Looking beyond Miranda, the Court articulated a "causal
connection" test, specifically outlining three factors for determining whether a confession is obtained by exploitation of an
illegal arrest: "[TJ he temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession; the presence of intervening circumstances; and, par'9 6
ticularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
After examining the record, the Brown Court held the defendant's confession inadmissible because: (1) less than two hours
had elapsed between the arrest and confession; (2) there was no
significant intervening event; and (3) the arrest had a "quality of
purposefulness in that it was an expedition for evidence admit'97
tedly undertaken in the hope that something might turn up.
The appellate division in Dunaway distinguished Brown,
primarily relying on the dissimilar police conduct in the two
cases. The appellate division noted that the police conduct in
Dunaway did not resemble the flagrancy and purposefulness
apparent in Brown.98 Rather, it was highly protective of Dunaway's fifth and sixth amendment rights. 99
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the appellate division's rationale, stated:
This betrays a lingering confusion between "voluntariness" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and the "causal connection" test established in Brown. Satisfying the Fifth Amendment is only the
"threshold" condition of the Fourth Amendment analysis required
by Brown .... To admit petitioner's confession in such a case
would allow "law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash
Warnings Do Not Per Se Render Admissible A Confession Following An Arrest Which Violates Fourth Amendment Rights, 25 EMORY L.J. 227 (1976).
93. Miranda warnings in no way inform a person of his fourth amendment rights, including his right to be released from unlawful custody following an arrest made without a warrant or without probable cause. Brown v.

Illinois, 422 U.S. at 601 n.6.
94. Id. at 601.
95. A finding that Miranda warnings have been given is essential to
fourth amendment analysis. If the police have violated the defendant's fifth
amendment rights, the evidence would be inadmissible, and there would be

no need to examine the connection between the fourth amendment violation and the confession.
96. 422 U.S. at 603.
97. Id. at 605.
98. Dunaway v. New York, 61 A.D.2d 299, 303-04, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493

(1978).
99. Id. at 302, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
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their hands in the 'procedural safeguards' of the Fifth."'10 0
The Court believed that Dunaway was a virtual replica of the
situation in Brown, although different labels were used to define
the detentions that occurred.
An Analysis of the "Causal Connection" Test
Brown's "causal connection" test was designed to serve two
purposes: (1) to insure the voluntariness of confessions obtained in illegal custodial surroundings, and (2) to protect fourth
amendment interests, namely, to insure that fourth amendment
violations are not encouraged by Miranda warnings providing a
cure-all. Such a result would reduce the fourth amendment to a
form of words' 0 1 and certainly would not enhance the deterrence of fourth amendment violations.
The first two Brown factors, the temporal proximity of the
arrest and confession, and the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, relate to whether the confession is "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the
unlawful invasion. 10 2 An "illegal detention in the coercive atmosphere of a police station [should] not be lightly overlooked."'10 3 The "free will" of the defendant, in this context,
however, means something more than the absence of coercion
or compliance with fifth amendment safeguards. Instead, the focus is on "attenuating" the causal connection between the
fourth amendment violation and the subsequent incriminating
statements.
The Supreme Court in both Brown and Dunaway found significant the fact that very little time had elapsed between the
defendants' arrests and confessions. However, this factor alone
is too ambiguous to be determinative. The Court implied that
the longer the time lapse, the more likely the confession would
be purged. This approach is unacceptable if a prolonged detention in the face of police influences is to be viewed as a continuing violation of the fourth amendment. 1° 4 A continual detention
100. 442 U.S. at 219 (quoting in part 25

EMORY

L.J. 227, 238 (1976)).

101. See note 91 supra.
102. United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 1979)
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 486). See notes 139-156 and
accompanying text infra.

103. United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 393 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).

104. See Comment, Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule-Miranda
Warnings Do Not Per Se Render Admissible A Confession Following An Arrest Which Violates FourthAmendment Rights, 25 EMORY L.J. 227, 241 (1976)
("If the accused is held in continuous unconstitutional custody, for a long
period of time, would not that fact indicate oppressive circumstances tending to cause him to 'give up?' ").
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for several hours, without any intervening events would be no
less of an exploitation of the illegal detention than a statement
made within minutes after arrival at the station. 10 5 Thus, the
"temporal proximity" factor should be important only when
viewed in connection with the presence or absence of intervening circumstances.
The Supreme Court noted in Brown and Dunaway that
1 06
"there were no intervening circumstances whatsoever.'
Hence, the Court did not articulate the type of intervening circumstances which would serve to break the causal connection.
An example of an attenuating event which would probably be
deemed sufficient is the Wong Sun situation where the defendant was released from custody and voluntarily returned to the
police station several days later to confess. Whether a purging
event could occur while the defendant is still in custody, for ex10 7
ample a consultation with an attorney, remains unanswered.
However, if incriminating statements by a detained suspect are
to be deemed causally unrelated to his unlawful seizure, the intervening "happening" should be no less than some event away
from police influences.
The Brown Court indicated that the most important consid10 8
eration was the purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct.
The reason for this emphasis is clear, given one major purpose
of the exclusionary rule being deterrence of official misconduct.
This approach was also consistent with previous decisions in
which the Supreme Court did not invoke the exclusionary rule
where doing so would not have enhanced its deterrence value. 10 9
The facts in Brown were particularly illustrative of this last
factor. The police conduct could appropriately be labeled both
"purposeful" and "flagrant." After laying in wait on the defendant's stairway, the police surprised Brown with their guns
drawn and proceeded to conduct a warrantless search of his
apartment. He was subsequently arrested, handcuffed, and
105. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("If there are no relevant intervening circumstances, a prolonged detention
may well be a more serious exploitation of an illegal arrest than a short
one.").
106. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-04; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at

218.
107. In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), it was suggested at oral argu-

ment that release of the defendant from unconstitutional detention or the
presence of defendant's attorney would constitute an intervening factor.
See 16 CRrM. L. REP. (BNA) 4226, 4227-28 (Mar. 26, 1975). See also Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[E]ven an immediate confession may have been motivated by a prearrest event such as a visit
with a minister.").
108. 422 U.S. at 603-04.
109. See note 12 supra.
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transported to the police station for custodial interrogation. The
police were fully aware that they did not have probable cause to
"arrest" Brown. 110

In contrast to Brown, the confrontation between the police
and Dunaway was not "calculated to cause surprise, fright and
confusion." The police did detain Dunaway without probable
cause, but he was not placed under arrest, and their initial contact with him did not resemble the abusive manner in which
Brown was "seized." Furthermore, although the conduct of the
police was "purposeful," in the sense that it was "investigatory"
in nature, the highest state court in New York had previously
ruled that such a "custodial detention" was lawful on a lesser
standard than probable cause,1 1 ' and the Supreme Court had
yet to rule on the constitutionality of the New York standard.
Based on these facts, it is entirely possible that the police were
acting under the good faith belief that the detention was constitutionally permissible under the fourth amendment." 2 Therefore, excluding the evidence obtained while Dunaway was
detained cannot be justified solely by looking to the Brown decision. The Brown analysis assumes that the police knowingly violate the fourth amendment, and is based, in large part, on
deterring fourth amendment violations." 3 The police conduct to
be deterred is that in which police knowingly flout fourth
amendment standards.
The Dunaway Court reaffirmed that the "causal connection" test established in Brown is to be utilized to determine
whether a confession made following an illegal seizure is admissible. However, reconciling Dunaway's facts with the Court's
holding that the evidence was inadmissible, indicates thai Duna110. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 605. ("The impropriety of the arrest was
obvious; awareness of the fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives
...in their testimony .... ").
111. People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 357, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1968). See note 30 supra.
112. Of course inquiring into the subjective state of mind of the police
officer might be unsatisfactory as a determining factor since this approach
is peculiarly subject to manipulation. But an objective analysis of the facts
in Dunaway clearly point to "good faith" on the part of police officers.
Three members of the United States Supreme Court, however, advocate
limiting the focus tothis factor alone. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at
226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Burger); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 602 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
113. The Brown Court's discussion of the test reflects this deterrent purpose. When the Court explained that voluntariness is only the threshold
requirement of fourth amendment analysis, and that the fourth amendment
serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the
fifth, it stated that if Miranda warnings alone would allow the admission of
the evidence following an illegal arrest, this would not "sufficiently deter a
Fourth Amendment violation." 422 U.S. at 601. See note 91 supra.
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way, to some extent, departed from the Brown analysis. Specifically, Dunaway at least impliedly discounted the importance of
the last factor-"the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." This case seems to be a departure from the rationale
that deterrence is the only real basis for the exclusionary rule.
If the exclusionary rule is to serve as a deterrent, the exclusion of evidence is inappropriate where officers act under a good
114
faith belief that their conduct is constitutionally permissible.
Similarly, the courts would not be sanctioning official misconduct, and thereby compromising their integrity, by allowing the
admission of a confession found voluntary under the fifth
amendment, where it was not obtained through an intentional or
knowing violation of the fourth amendment. Given that the purpose of the fourth amendment guarantee is the protection of individual rights, the most logical explanation for the exclusionary
rule, in this context, is that the individual has the right to have
tainted evidence excluded.
Dunaway presented the Supreme Court an excellent opportunity to examine the Brown "causal connection" test. Rejecting the New York courts' application of Brown, the Court
stated that it "betrayed a lingering confusion between voluntariness for purposes of the fifth amendment and the causal connection test established in Brown."'115 However, by failing to give
any in depth treatment to the "causal connection" issue, and by
only impliedly departing from the underlying rationale of
Brown, the Dunaway Court did little to remedy the existing
confusion which is certain to surround future application of the
"attenuation doctrine" in lower courts.
RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF DUNAWAY

The Illinois Supreme Court and United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have recently considered the admissibility of statements made following illegal arrests. 116 These
decisions reveal the inconsistent results likely to continue surfacing as a consequence of Dunaway.
114. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Dunaway, indicated
that the deterrent purpose of the rule is sometimes interpreted quite differently, and in his view, the justification for excluding evidence obtained unlawfully was to motivate the law enforcement profession as a whole "to
adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the future invasion of
the citizen's constitutional rights." 442 U.S. at 221.
115. 442 U.S. at 219.

116. United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979); People
v. Gabbard, 78 Ill. 2d 88, 398 N.E.2d 574 (1979).
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People v. Gabbard-IllinoisSupreme Court
Facts
In People v. Gabbard,1 17 the defendant was convicted of
burglary and armed robbery and was sentenced to 20 to 40 years
imprisonment. An appellate court reversed and remanded for a
new trial, 118 and the Supreme Court of Illinois granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal. Scrutiny of the circumstances of defendant's arrest and subsequent conviction is
needed to place the Illinois court's opinion in context. At 7:00
a.m. on April 29, 1979, the defendant was seen walking along the
shoulder of Highway 66, on the outskirts of Lincoln, Illinois. A
state police officer stopped him pursuant to police department
policy requiring checks of every person found walking on the
120
road."19 The defendant proceeded to enter the police vehicle,
and after offering the anomalous answer that he was both going
to and coming from Springfield, he was asked for identification.
After producing only personalized checks and failing to possess
an Illinois driver's license (which the police officer thought he
saw tucked in the checkbook), defendant was ordered to place
his head on the dashboard, with his hands behind him. 12 1 The
officer then drew his weapon and handcuffed Gabbard. A search
of the checkbook revealed two drivers' licenses, one of which
was eventually found to belong to the victim of a robbery. While
proceeding to the police station, and after transmitting the defendant's name over the police radio, the officer learned that
Gabbard was an escapee from a mental institution. Some
eleven hours later, after being shown a sketch of the prime suspect, which resembled him, and after being confronted with evidence that he had been identified at an earlier lineup, the
122
defendant gave a very circumstantial account of the robbery.
117. 78 Ill. 2d 88, 398 N.E.2d 574 (1979).

118. 67 Ill. App. 3d 945, 385 N.E.2d 366 (1979). The appellate court held
that defendant's arrest had been invalid, and consequently the trial court
should have granted his pretrial motion to suppress the items seized at the
time of his arrest. The court went on to hold, however, that the inculpatory
statements made by the defendant while in police custody were admissible
despite the illegality of the arrest.
119. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officer testified

that one of the reasons for this policy was to ascertain whether someone
was in need of assistance. People v. Gabbard, 78 111.2d at 92, 398 N.E.2d at
576.
120. The testimony of the police officer and the defendant conflicted on
this point. The officer testified that the defendant voluntarily got into the
car, while the defendant claimed that he was summoned to get into the car.
Id. at 91, 398 N.E.2d at 575.
121. This was the substance of the police officer's testimony.
122. People v. Gabbard, 78 Ill. 2d at 98, 398 N.E.2d at 578. Defendant was
originally questioned about the robbery at approximately 9:00 a.m. by a
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Analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
The issues before the supreme court were: the legality of
the arrest; the admissibility of the items seized at the time of
arrest; and the admissibility of the defendant's inculpatory
statements made thereafter while in police custody. The
supreme court, agreeing with the appellate court, ruled that the
arrest had been illegal. 123 Consequently, it held that the items
seized at this time should have been suppressed. 124 Because
the case had to be retried, the court considered whether the inculpatory statements regarding the robbery should also have
been suppressed. After reviewing the causal connection test,
the court stated that "[tIhe circumstances of the arrest and the
incriminating statements here are markedly different than those
in" both Brown and Dunaway.125 The statements were held to
be admissible at any new trial.
After twice noting that the defendant had been informed of
his Miranda rights, and waived them, the court distinguished
Brown and Dunaway on the ground that the "purpose" of the
unlawful arrest was not to interrogate the defendant about the
crime to which his subsequent statements related. The court
also emphasized that the interrogating officer was not even
detective who had been informed that the driver's license of one of the victims was found in defendant's possession. At this time, defendant made no
response to the questions concerning the robbery. Defendant was then
driven to the sheriff's office in Springfield and in the afternoon was interrogated by a deputy sheriff who showed him a composite sketch of the suspect. When asked whether he thought the sketch resembled him,
defendant responded that there were many similar characteristics. After
being advised that he would appear in a lineup at which he would be viewed
by victims of the robbery, defendant reportedly offered to cooperate if consideration would be given to his testimony. The detective informed defendant that he had no authority to enter into an agreement, but relayed the
information to his superiors. After the lineup that evening, defendant was
informed that he had been identified by two of the victims. A further conversation took place between the deputy sheriff and the defendant, at which
time, eleven hours after he was arrested and after being asked to supply
information about the robbery, defendant gave a circumstantial account of
the robbery, the specific nature of which was not reported.
123. Citing Dunaway, the court believed that the defendant's handcuffing constituted an arrest. The only basis upon which the court could have
found the arrest valid was that the officer had, six days earlier, received a
report of persons wanted by the police. Among the reports distributed was
one which contained a description of the escapee from the mental institution. On direct examination, however, the police officer testified that the
only reason he had stopped the defendant was to "check out what he was
doing." On cross-examination by the State, the officer offered the report as
a further reason. Because the description contained in the report was so
"general and lacking in distinctness," the supreme court ruled that there
were not reasonable grounds, at the time of the arrest, to believe that the
defendant was the escapee. Id. at 94, 398 N.E.2d at 576.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 96, 398 N.E.2d at 577.
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aware of the circumstances of the arrest. Therefore, the court,
citing Dunaway, held: "[TI he purpose of the exclusionary rule,
i.e. to deter improper police conduct would be served minimally,
126
if at all, by exclusion of defendant's statements."'
In further support of its holding, the court indicated that the
defendant's statements were also prompted by intervening
events. According to the court, these events included: (1) the
sketch being shown to the defendant, and his acknowledgement
that it resembled him; (2) defendant's implied admission of involvement by offering cooperation in exchange for leniency; and
(3) the lineup identification after which the defendant was informed that he had been identified by the victim. 1 27 The court,
however, acknowledged the inherent difficulty in considering
the lineup identification an intervening event, particularly since
the State conceded that the lineup evidence should have been
128
suppressed.
Finally, the court cited two Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decisions as supporting its ruling that the inculpatory statements were admissible because not causally related to the unconstitutional invasion of the defendant's rights. 129 Reliance on
these precedents appears strained. The first Pennsylvania case
cited, Commonwealth v. Wright,130 was decided before Brown v.
Illinois'3 ' introduced the three-prong "causal connection" test.
132
The other Pennsylvania decision, Commonwealth v. Bogan,
though decided after Brown, is easily distinguishable. In Bogan, the intervening events occurring between the defendant's
arrest and confession were his appearance before a judge and
126. Id. at 98-99, 398 N.E.2d at 579.
127. Id. at 99, 398 N.E.2d at 579. In addition, the court stated "when the
defendant, immediately preceding his inculpatory account of the robbery,

was told that he had been identified by each of the viewers at the lineup, he
responded to that information by stating that he was not surprised." Id.

128. The supreme court did not directly decide the issue of whether the
lineup evidence should have been suppressed, because it determined that

the state had waived any objection. The defendant had sought to suppress
the lineup identification contending that the lineup was a consequence of
the unlawful arrest. Since the state conceded that this evidence should
have been suppressed, the supreme court, rather than deciding the question of whether lineup testimony should be treated by the same standards
as confessions, held only that the state had waived any objection to suppressing this evidence. Id.
129. Commonwealth v. Bogan, 482 Pa. 151, 393 A.2d 424 (1978) (defend-

ant's confession found voluntarily made, free of any element of coercion,
and not resulting from an exploitation of his illegal arrest); Commonwealth
v. Wright, 460 Pa. 247, 332 A.2d 809 (1975) (defendant's confrontation with

his accomplice prompted his confession, not any exploitation of the circumstances of his arrest).
130. 460 Pa. 247, 332 A.2d 809 (1975).

131. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
132. 482 Pa. 151, 393 A.2d 424 (1978).
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133
an arraignment on an unrelated charge.
The Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning in holding admissible the defendant's inculpatory statements 134 indicates its failure to grasp the distinction between "voluntariness for purposes
of the fifth amendment and the 'causal connection' test established in Brown. '135 The distinction between the "purpose" of
the police conduct in Gabbard,as compared to Brown and Dunaway, would justifiably been deemed controlling but for the fact
that Dunaway appeared to have dispelled the overriding importance of this factor. However, since Dunaway at least recognized the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct as a
relevant point of inquiry, an analysis of the police conduct in
Gabbardis appropriate.
Indeed, the arresting officer's purpose in apprehending Gabbard was not to interrogate him on the crime to which he later
made incriminating statements; there was no basis whatsoever
upon which to arrest the defendant. 136 Ifthe "flagrancy" factor
is to be accorded any weight, the facts surrounding the officer's
initial contact with the defendant should not have been overlooked. 137 Moreover, if the purpose of the exclusionary rule is,
as the court believed, only deterrence of official misconduct,
Gabbard's facts present a particularly compelling case for an
application of the exclusionary rule. Why should it matter
whether the interrogating officer knew of the circumstances surrounding the suspect's arrest, or, whether the arresting officer's

133. Id. at 152 n.4, 393 A.2d at 427-28 n.4 (defendant returned from his
arraignment on an unrelated charge, and completed his statement providing numerous additional details).
134. Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed
with the Gabbard majority on whether the defendant's arrest was illegal.
He conceded, however, that the majority, in determining that the arrest was
invalid, "utilized somewhat tortuous reasoning to uphold the admissibility
of the defendant's inculpatory statements." 78 Ill.
2d at 105, 398 N.E.2d at
582.
135. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
136. Justice Underwood, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Justice Ryan, believed that "[o]nce the defendant had denied the possession of any identification other than the checks, it seems to me the officer, who had seen a driver's license, acted quite reasonably in arresting
defendant in the belief that an offense had been committed by him." 78 Ill.
2d at 103, 398 N.E.2d at 581. It should be noted, however, that the defendant
was not operating a motor vehicle at the time of his encounter with the police officer. Justice Underwood did not make clear exactly what offense he
believed the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for, although
he suggested that the report that described the escapee was on the officer's
mind at the time of the stop.
Justice Clark, also concurring in part and dissenting in part, believed
that the totality of the facts and circumstances, known to the arresting officer justified the arrest, and that the majority had "become bogged down in
a morass of details." Id. at 105, 398 N.E.2d at 582.
137. See notes 117-21 and accompanying text supra.
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purpose in apprehending the suspect was to question him about
the crime to which he later made incriminating statements?
This approach seems particularly susceptible to police manipulation.
An even more alarming result of the Gabbard decision is
the court's interpretation of what constitutes "intervening circumstances." It is indeed questionable that an intervening
event which is to serve as a break in the "causal connection"
between the initial illegality and the subsequent evidence is any
13 8
event perpetuated by police influences.
United States v. Perez-Esparza: Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals
I
In United States v. Perez-Esparza,139 the Ninth Circuit recently had occasion to consider the "attenuation doctrine" in the
aftermath of Dunaway. By holding inadmissible for "insufficient attenuation," certain contraband and inculpatory statements obtained subsequent to the defendant's unlawful arrest,
Perez-Esparza offers a striking contrast to Gabbard.
Facts
Based upon stipulated facts, the defendant was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 140 He appealed
from the district court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress
the contraband and statements elicited during his detention.
Drug Enforcement Administrative (DEA) agents, acting on an
informant's tip, 14' alerted California law enforcement agencies
138. See note 127 and accompanying text suprafor a summary of the "intervening events" listed by the court. The court did not expressly deal with
the factor identified as the "temporal proximity" between the arrest and
confession, but it appears that it also considered the application of this factor to be in favor of allowing admissibility. Significantly, the appellate
court, 67 111. App. 3d 945, 385 N.E.2d 366 (1979), whose opinion was affirmed,
noted that more than eight hours had elapsed between the initial illegal
arrest of defendant and his inculpatory statements. The court did not note,

however, that the defendant was held in "continuous" police custody during
this time. A mechanical application of the "temporal proximity" factor in

this fashion is not at all persuasive. The fact that there was such a great
time lapse, with no intervening factors not subject to police influences,
should be deemed as "aggravating" the situation rather than "attenuating"
it, especially in light of the events occurring during this time. See note 122
supra.
139. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
140. The defendant was originally charged with (1) importing and at-

tempting to import cocaine, and (2) possession and intent to distribute cocaine. The first count was dismissed, and he was convicted on the second

count for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841 (A) (1). Id. at 1285.
141. The informant, who had supplied reliable information on some
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to a certain automobile suspected in narcotics smuggling. 14 2
Pursuant to tightened security, the defendant's automobile was
stopped at the border patrol checkpoint at San Clemente and
ordered to an inspection area. The defendant was then taken to
a border patrol office to await questioning by DEA agents. After
nearly a three-hour delay, the agents arrived and informed the
defendant that he was being detained because of suspected
smuggling activity. At this time, he was also advised of Miranda
warnings. Subsequently, the defendant signed a written consent authorizing the agents to search his car, which resulted in
the discovery of cocaine concealed in a headlight. Following
seizure of the contraband, the defendant made incriminating
143
statements.
Analysis of the Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the contraband
seized and the subsequent statements made by the defendant
were "fruits of an illegal seizure" and should have been suppressed.'4 Adjudicating the propriety of the initial stop, the
court noted that the informant's tip provided "reasonable suspicion" but that this did not necessarily render the subsequent detention lawful. The detention was for the purpose of "custodial
interrogation" and, thus, controlled by Dunaway. Therefore,
consistent with Dunaway, the "detention for custodial interrogation" was found sufficiently similar to an "arrest" so as to retwenty occasions, advised DEA agents that a beige 1971 Ford, with California license plates was being used to smuggle narcotics. Id.
142. Originally the information was entered into the border computer but
because of an error in the system, the defendant's car was not stopped the

previous evening when the car entered the United States at a border crossing. Id.
143. The statements made by Perez-Esparza were that he had been paid
to drive the car and was aware of the fact that it contained cocaine. Id.
144. Id. at 1291. The district judge, in denying the defendant's motion to
suppress stated:
As the Courts have repeatedly stated, each case must stand on its own
feet, and taking all the evidence in this case, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, I think there was probable cause to stop the car. They had the information; as you say, they
could have searched it at the border without any search warrant; they
had been looking for the car for some time, and the Border Patrol had
been notified of the license number and the type of car; and when it
approached the inspection point, I think there was grounds to stop the
car. Then the defendant gave written consent to search it when he was
advised that they could get a search warrant. I think taking all this evidence into consideration that there was probable cause to stop it.
There was a written consent to search it. The Motion to Suppress the
evidence is overruled, and the Motion to Suppress statements is overruled.
Id. at 1286 n.1.
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quire probable cause. Since the basis for the detention was the
informant's tip, which was not sufficient to meet the standard of
probable cause, 145 the court held the defendant's detention illegal.
In view of this initial determination, the court considered
the effect of the illegality on the admissibility of the seized evidence and inculpatory statements. The court identified the
proper inquiry as being "whether the unconsitutional police
conduct was sufficiently attentuated from the voluntary consent
to search and the inculpatory statements to avoid exclusion
from evidence."' 4 6 After reviewing the Brown "causal connection" test, the court concluded that there was insufficient "attenuation." It noted that Miranda warnings are not dispositive,
since satisfying fifth amendment safeguards "is merely a thresh147
hold requirement for fourth amendment analysis."'
While recognizing that fourth amendment interests deserve
protection irrespective of fifth amendment rights, the court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court has given
conflicting signals as to the real purpose of the exclusionary rule
when utilized to implement the fourth amendment. 148 However,
145. The Perez-Esparza court found that the tip did not give the police
probable cause to arrest the defendant because it did not satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test that must be met before an informer's tip can
provide the basis for probable cause. See Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S.
410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (testing the sufficiency of an
affidavit filed in support of a search warrant which was based on an informant's tip). The Aguilar-Spinelli test requires that the tip detail (1) facts
which show the informer is credible or the information is reliable (the "veracity" prong), and (2) underlying circumstances which verify the validity
of the informer's conclusions (the basis of "knowledge" prong). See United
States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d at 1287. The second part of the test can be
satisfied if the informer's tip is sufficiently detailed so as to allow an inference that the information was gained in a reliable fashion. See Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (example of the detail required to satisfy
the second part of the test). Using Draperas a standard, the Perez-Esparza
court stated, "[Identifying a specific vehicle in general use for smuggling
lacks the extensive corroborative detail-particulars for a smuggling tripfound sufficient in Draper." Therefore,. the court held, "the information
given by the informant does not verify the validity of his conclusions and
the second part of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is not met." 609 F.2d. at 1288.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604).
148. 609 F.2d at 1288-89. As the court noted, the Supreme Court has not
been consistent on whether the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter official misconduct, or whether judicial integrity concerns are equally
important. Compare United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (deterrence is the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary rule) and Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976) (primary justification for the exclusionary rule is deterrence) with Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) and Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200 (1979) (both cases noting that the exclusionary rule protects
fourth amendment guarantees in two respects: deterrence and judicial integrity).

19801

Dunaway v. New York

the court chose to adopt the Dunaway "formulation" because it
believed that its facts were not substantially different than those
presented to the Supreme Court in Dunaway. Dunaway indicated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter improper police conduct and to avoid compromising judicial
integrity. 149 The Perez-Esparza court believed that the factors
enunciated in Brown, and reaffirmed in Dunaway, were to be
examined in light of these twin policies. Accordingly, the first
two factors: the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, and the presence of intervening events had to be scrutinized to determine the "free will" of the defendant.1 50 Thus,
"the defendant's free will must be sufficient to render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial integrity purposes that justify
excluding [the evidence].I '' l Similarly, the "purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct" must be examined in light
of these dual exclusionary rule policies. If the evidence has
been obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality, the appli5 2
cation of the exclusionary rule is particularly appropriate.
After applying the "causal connection" test to the facts
before it, the Perez-Esparza court concluded that the evidence
should have been excluded. First, despite a three-hour delay between the initial illegality and the consent and inculpatory
statements, the government failed to set forth any intervening
circumstances not themselves influenced by police.153 Although
the defendant's decision to consent and confess appeared voluntary under the fifth amendment, the court stated: "[W]e [cannot] find that [his] decision was so independent of police
pressures as to absolve the judicial system from charges of savoring the forbidden fruits of unconstitutional conduct."1 54 Finally, the Perez-Esparza court considered the purpose and
flagrancy of official misconduct factor. The court conceded that
149. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979).
150. 609 F.2d at 1289.
151. Id. The court stated:

In some cases, the intervening completely self-motivated decision of a
putative defendant to inculpate himself is so unforseeable an event,
from the arresting officer's vantage point, that excluding the defendant's statement would serve no deterrent purpose. . . . Moreover,

where a defendant makes an unconstrained, independent decision to
confess or consent, judicial integrity is not compromised by respecting
the defendant's decision to consent to a search or admit his guilt.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 1290 (emphasis supplied). The court stated, "[H]is decision to
consent and confess while still in custody, and only three hours after his
initial detention, was not an unforseeable result of his illegal detention.
Thus, the deterrence rationale was not vitiated, as in Wong Sun, by a
lengthy period away from police influence."

154. Id.
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the official misconduct was not as flagrant as in Brown, but that
"Dunaway was decided on very similar facts and the Supreme
Court specifically rejected the possibility that such facts dist55
inguished Dunaway from Brown."'
Thus, the Perez-Esparzacourt, in finding "insufficient attenuation" to justify admission of the "presumptively tainted" evidence, specifically rejected the contention that the somewhat
warranted police conduct could overcome the finding of no attenuation on the first two factors. The court believed that Duna56
way required such a result.
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court in Gabbard5 7 specifically distinguished its case from Dunaway on the ground
that the "purpose" of the police conduct and the circumstances
surrounding the arrest were markedly different. 58 By a very
narrow construction, it might be argued that if the purpose of
the unlawful arrest is not to interrogate the suspect about the
crime to which his later statements relate, then they are not obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality. Thus, had the totality of the circumstances warranted a finding of "attenuation"
in Gabbard, the "innocent" purpose might properly have been
weighted in favor of admissibility. However, in Gabbard,the initial illegal arrest amounted to a flagrant violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 159 The items seized at the time
of arrest led to the subsequent interrogation and lineup. Furthermore, these items were suppressed on the ground that the
arrest was unlawful. The lineup itself was admittedly improper,
requiring exclusion of this evidence at any new trial.
It is a very curious result to hold that these "fruits" of the
illegal arrest are inadmissible, but that the inculpatory statements are not "tainted" by the same illegality because of the arresting officer's "purpose," and the interrogating officer's
ignorance of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Moreover, it is quite frankly inconceivable that the state supreme
155. Id.
156. The court did not believe that the facts of the case before it were
substantially different than those in Dunaway to allow it to deviate from
Dunaway's finding of insufficient attenuation. As the Perez-Esparzacourt
stated:

The Court in Dunaway gave short shrift to the purpose and flagrancy
factor emphasized in Brown. Although we do not, Dunaway's sweeping language, and the lack of police justification in this case, compel us
to conclude that the last factor is insufficient to overcome the lack of
attenuation dictated by the first two factors.
Id. at 1291.
157. 78 Ill.
2d 88, 398 N.E.2d 574 (1979).
158. Id. at 96, 398 N.E.2d at 377. See text accompanying notes 124-25
supra.
159. See notes 117-21 and accompanying text supra.
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court could even consider an "illegal lineup" as an intervening
event in support of "attenuation."
The ultimate result is that the most flagrant police misconduct, an arrest without any justification whatever, while providing the court with the easiest case for terming the "seizure"
unconstitutional, legitimatizes the law enforcement activity by
employing this same outright flagrancy against the accused in
attenuation analysis. Consequently, the individual's fourth
amendment guarantee to be free from "unreasonable searches
and seizures" is significantly impaired, and the effect of the exclusionary rule is substantially diluted.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court, in Dunaway, announced
160
that it would decide the issue it had reserved in Morales,
namely, the constitutionality of custodial interrogation when
predicated upon less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest.161 The Court rejected the view that a balancing test could
be utilized in determining the "reasonableness" of such a
"seizure," holding that an involuntary custodial interrogation so
severely intrudes upon the privacy of an individual, that it can
only be justified by a showing of probable cause-the same standard that applies to arrests. 162 The significance of the Court's
160. Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969). See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
161. It is interesting to note that at least one federal court that has interpreted Dunaway decided that the Supreme Court announced no new principal of law, and therefore its holding must be applied retroactively. United
States v. Tucker, 610 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1979). Faced with a factual situation
similar to that in Dunaway, the Second Circuit concluded that a detention
in a police station "holding pen" for several hours for investigative purposes
must be supported by probable cause. Acknowledging that the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 366 N.E.2d 248, 397
N.Y.S.2d 587 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 (1978), had held that under
exceptional circumstances an investigative seizure was lawful without
probable cause, the majority nevertheless concluded that Dunaway did not
"decide an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly forshadowed." 610 F.2d at 1012. Thus, the court stated, "we are ... compelled
to find that on the present record, the Government has failed to show that
the police and FBI agents could reasonably have believed that their conduct
was lawful." Id. at 1012.
The dissent believed that on the basis of Morales, the officers had ample reason to think that their conduct was lawful, and Dunaway indeed
clarified and expanded fourth amendment requirements. 610 F.2d at 1014-15
(Van Graafeiland, Circuit Judge, dissenting). Moreover, the dissent argued
that neither the deterrence nor judicial integrity purposes of the exclusionary rule would "be furthered by retroactive application of Dunaway's clarifying holding." Id. at 1018.
162. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979). Cf. United States v.
Sanchez-Jaramillo, No. 78-2649 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 1980) wherein the court determined that government agents, acting without probable cause to arrest
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holding is perhaps in its refusal to extend Terry to encompass a
setting so closely resembling a traditional arrest, and one involving an invasion so substantially different from the narrow intrusions in Terry and its progeny 163 which were judged by a
balancing test rather than by the standard of probable cause.
Had the Court drawn a distinction between the custodial interrogation at the station house, and the traditional arrest, it would
have seriously undercut fourth amendment safeguards and significantly departed from the general rule that "seizures" are reasonable only if supported by probable cause. Moreover, the
possibility of abuse would have been devastating if the permissible grounds of police conduct would have been judged by the
label that the police attached to the intrusion.
The troublesome aspect of Dunaway is, therefore, not in its
primary holding, but rather in its inextensive and rather confusing "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. 64 The Court had the
opportunity to examine the Brown "causal connection" test for
defendant, violated his fourth amendment rights when they seized and detained him in his own apartment, notwithstanding the fact that his roommate was under lawful arrest, and had consented to a search of the
apartment.
163. See note 55 supra.
164. In the recent case of People v. Dowdell, 81 Ill.
App.3d 266, 401 N.E.2d
295 (1980), the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, answered one question impliedly reserved in Dunaway and constructed a poison-tree analysis
that appears much more expansive than that contemplated by the Supreme
Court and the Illinois Supreme Court in Gabbard. In Dowdell, the defendant was convicted of burglary. He had been transported to the police station for purposes of questioning on a different burglary. After waiving his
Miranda rights, defendant made inculpatory statements regarding the burglary he was ultimately found guilty of, following denial of his motion to
suppress.
The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the case
was so similar to Dunaway that defendant's motion should have been
granted. Id. at 270, 401 N.E.2d at 298. The prosecution sought to distinguish
Dunaway by placing significance on the fact that the officers expressly testified that Dunaway would have been arrested had he been unwilling to accompany them to the station. Police testified that Dowdell would not have
been arrested had he refused to be transported to the custodial interrogation room. The court responded, stating that it failed "to see how the results should depend on the uncommunicated ideas or intentions of the
police officers. To suggest that defendant was not seized merely because
after the fact the police officers disclaimed any intention of arresting the
defendant would permit the evasion of Fourth Amendment protections."
Id. Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 n.6 (1980) ("We
agree with the District Court that the subjective intention of the DEA agent
in this case to detain the respondent, had she attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the respondent.").
See note 61 supra.
Considering whether the statements were admissible despite the illegal
detention, the Dowdell court adopted "the standards set forth in Dunaway"
and concluded that even if they were voluntary under fifth amendment
standards "there must be intervening circumstances sufficient to remove
the taint of the illegal detention." 81 Ill.
App. 3d at 270, 401 N.E. 2d at 298.
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"attenuation" and to focus on the rationale behind the three-factor test it had previously set forth. Instead, the Court overstated
the similarities between its case and Brown, and simply reaffirmed that the Brown test was to continue as the standard by
which lower courts determine whether evidence connected to a
fourth amendment violation is to be excluded as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." However, by its own rather mechanical application of the three-factor test, the Court departed from reliance
on the factor it had identified in Brown as most important-"the
purpose and flagrancy" of the official misconduct, by failing to
give any weight to the rather drastic differences between the
flagrancy of the police conduct in Brown as compared to that in
Dunaway. Consequently, the Court left in doubt the importance which should be attached to each factor. It also left unanswered whether "attenuation" on one or two factors could
overcome the lack of it on another, 165 although the Court
perhaps impliedly determined that "attenuation" on the last
factor was insufficient to overcome a contrary finding on the first
two factors.
Perhaps the only truly relevant factor which a court should
concern itself with is the presence or absence of intervening
events which would serve either to remove the taint of the initial
illegality or to aggravate it. The Court would be well advised to
reexamine the "attenuation doctrine" and clarify existing rules
The court determined that there were no such circumstances from which it
could find that the effect of the illegal detention was attenuating.
It is interesting to note that the court in Dowdell did not cite or adopt
any part of the reasoning of Gabbard. Gabbard,in finding sufficient "attenuation" to allow admission into evidence of defendant's inculpatory statements, placed primary emphasis on the fact that the police conduct was not
"flagrant," and the arresting officer's "purpose" in apprehending Gabbard

was not to interrogate him about the crime to which his later statements
related. In Dowdell, the officers initial contact with the defendant was not

as flagrant as in Brown v. Illinois,but instead remarkably similar to that in
Dunaway. It was also less intrusive than in Gabbard. Moreover, as in Gabbard, the "purpose" of apprehending Dowdell was not to question him

about the crime of which he was later convicted. Dowdell appears consistent with Dunaway but inharmonious with the recent decision of the state
supreme court. The conclusion seems inescapable that Gabbard cannot be
squared with Dunaway.

165. The fact that this question remains unanswered is best reflected by
the conflicting decisions of United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284

(9th Cir. 1979), holding that the somewhat justified police conduct could not
overcome the lack of "attenuation" on the first two factors, and People v.
Gabbard, 78 Ill. 2d 88, 398 N.E.2d 574 (1979) in which the Illinois Supreme
Court distinguished its case from Dunaway and Brown on the basis of its

belief that the police conduct was neither "flagrant" nor "purposeful." See
notes 155-56 and accompanying text supra. See text accompanying notes
125-26 supra.
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regarding its application in order to curb the confusion that Dunaway has already triggered.
Rosanne J. Faraci

